

II

Erratic being, discordant being

4. 2 (82-89)

We followed this tortuous path not only in an attempt to clarify the ascent of Heideggerian thinking, but also in order to look over, from these heights, the radicality of his condemnation of the erratic condition of the human being, a condition that could only be seen by Heidegger in its hunchbacked figure. Indeed, his description of erring, negative and perverted, is completely correct; it is correct to such an extent that it is recommended to hear it again and again so that its deep meaning can reach us. For Heidegger, this erring is the very expression of oblivion of being, of need [penuria] to which the human being succumbs in the age of technology. Rootless, worldless, obsessed with themselves, human beings navigate in the adrift epoch, tracing circles around the same axis, organizing and administrating arduously their scarcity in order to keep distracted from their void. They wander aimlessly, and at the same time they subdue the world to their rambling, making it turning around themselves and their will to dominion; leveling all the differences and grouping all the things under the one and only mould of the calculable, manageable and disponible.

Only a being that does not feel oneself *in* the world anymore, but rather in front of, against and over it, could adopt such a monstrous perspective. But if it does not feel itself in the world, it won't become what it can be, nor can he leave the world as the open possibility that it is. The *worldless* wanderer converts the world into something *unworldly*:

Beyond war and peace, there is the mere erring of the consumption of beings in the plan's self-guaranteeing in terms of the vacuum of the abandonment of Being [...] erring in which the vacuum expands which requires a single order and guarantee of beings. Herein the necessity of "leadership," that is, the planning calculation of the guarantee of the whole of beings, is required. For this purpose such men must be organized and equipped who serve leadership [...] and thus master erring in its calculability. The manner of understanding is the ability to calculate which has totally released itself in advance into the demands of the constantly increasing guarantee of plans in the service of the nearest possibilities of plans [...] Beings, which alone are admitted to the will to will, expand in a lack of differentiation which is only masked by

a procedure and arrangement which stands under the "principle of production." [...]

This lack of differentiation bears witness to the already guaranteed constancy of the unworld of the abandonment of Being. The earth appears as the unworld of erring. It is the erring star in the manner of the history of Being (Heidegger REF: 104-105,108-109)

The challenge that Heidegger poses to the modern age highlights that in the society we have been referring to as "stationary", the meaning of human activity has been established by anchoring it in an unique and ubiquitous mode of behaviour, namely the one moved by the anticipatory calculus and everything that refers to and has as its last horizon the construction of a reality always ready to be assumed by strategy, use, dominion. It is in this situation where an appearance comes up, an appearance of a human being which is (now) in movement, making history, widening the course of time, creating something new restlessly. But what is really happening, as suggested from the beginning, is that the human being is laboriously turning around a point that remains still. If there is something new, it is only from an empiric point of view, as nothing new surges in qualitative terms. After all, the history has stopped. Fukuyama was right then, but only in his illuminated denomination of the phenomenon: "the end of history", and not in the diagnosis of such an end. For in no way are we facing the ultimate conclusion of the positive course of progress, as if we had achieved – through marriage of liberal democracy and capitalism – the final conquest of liberty and as if the territory we gained in never-ending fights could not be more varied and perfect.

The society administrated by means of instrumental logic, through the technological-nihilist *dynamis* and the whole cohort of already diagnosed phenomena, as well as some others to be further summated in the following pages, grounds its reality in the detention of human history.

Let us leave aside the question if *the end of history* we are witnessing could be extended through processual language about the course of history, as suggested by the author of *The end of philosophy and the task of thinking*. However, this tenacious and closing processualism, vitalized by Heidegger when he understands the becoming of Occident as an intense consummation of occidental decadence in the history of nihilism, is untenable. For there are reasons to call into question the Heideggerian tendency to insert all the epochs into an unidimensional temporal

process, as if each of them, in its decadence, would accomplish the fall of the former age and anticipate a bigger one in the future. It seems necessary to correct this inverted Hegelianism of Heidegger. It is not possible to reduce history to a continuum, even a qualitative one, if it is not by its constitution in advance, which does not seem to fit into the Heideggerian conception itself. It is unclear that the stages of metaphysics can be reduced to a narrow Heideggerian interpretation. And then, in addition, we should argue that all thinking has its own internal contradictions, incompatible faces and possibilities yet to be unfolded, which can sometimes go *against the explicit corpus* that have generated them; possibilities which remain hidden, sometimes as a foe in the very core of the corpus. If it is certain what his disciple Gadamer shows, if the transmission of sense comes into view irremediably by means of the hermeneutic circle, in which the fusion of horizons between the apprehended and the interpretative apprehension produces, in their encounter, a new horizon, then historic dynamism should be understood without any internal disruption and logical fragility of its links. In fact, the stationary society, as it's been suggested, cannot be comprehended without this intromission of the resistance in its own territory, which works as a cove, or erosive and maybe even corrosive reflux.

On the other hand, the features of our age does not stem from the fact that it has surged by means of lineal unfolding in time and thus expresses its closed consummation. It is more accurate to notice that it is all about the collapse of historic time in its *essential* sense. If the temporality of human existence unfolds dynamic presence, which is rooted in the past and creates the future, it can be said that in stationary society this temporality has been unhinged and traded for a present, whose movement is rather a repetition of self, fictional transit within the fold of the *identical with itself* and which, because of this feature, obstructs the memory and closes *the door* on the call of the future. In the monotonous *time* proper of the *collapse of time* all the past ages are reduced to one, and all the futures are submerged in the iteration of the one and only possibility. That is why the contemporary Occidental man experiences more and more intensively the paradox of *lacking time and wasting time, at the same time*. But against this, there raises the resistance of an essential propulsion, which is present in every joint of the network of expansion. Recent protest movements, for instance anti- globalization movements, those who stand up against warmongering imperialism or against all-encompassing

neoliberalism, make manifest the uneasiness in civilization, which escalates and whose pustules have become difficult to cauterize with mere reform of what exists. In the age of the *collapse of time*, time as such resists being crammed; it just *does its job*. In the stationary society the dissatisfaction grows at the same rate as satisfaction, which means that it tends to become ungovernable as well as incorruptible.

The drive towards the genuinely new, which is indefinite, negative, and lacking determinable content, reveals that it does not ask for a concrete time, but rather for the renewal of time itself.

If Heidegger's understanding of history is incorrect and if the collapse of time in stationary society cannot be conceived as a holistic and an internally featureless encapsulation, it is because the erratic condition of the human beings is ineradicable. They are the factor of dispersion, and prevent the historical becoming from adopting a form of compendium. As an ex-centric resistance, they inject in each particular age contradiction and intestine war. This consideration will be soon subjected to a more rigorous justification. Before it happens, it is convenient to point out, as a necessary preamble, that Heideggerian labelling of erring as a deformed, inauthentic and mislaid event is monocular. Although the diagnosis of its negative symptoms is plausible, it does not manage to see the other side: the productivity. Heidegger deserves the same words that were directed to Sancho Panza by don Quixote, when the former, invaded by despair, forgot about the joy of erratic adventure they had endeavoured together and exacerbated lack of concrete conquests: "Is it possible - tells him the Sorrowful Face -that in all the time you have traveled with me you have not yet noticed that all things having to do with knights errant appear to be chimerical, foolish, senseless, and turned inside out?" (First Part, Chapter XXV) The Knight of La Mancha, who has experienced more disasters and reprimands than success and who is well aware of that, misses in his squire's recrimination the illuminating vision which is able to apprehend the very errant being as an unconditional value. Heidegger understands gloomy madness of erring. But then, there is also a prescient erring proper of the lucid madness of the *gentleman* of La Mancha. His *erring* is not an error; it is a *success*. The inhospitality of his destiny is also the hospitality of fate, and being nowhere.

From *being- in- the world*, so desired by Heidegger, emerges the responsibility of a response to an intimate and immanent call, to what the rooting asks from itself. This is the first condition of all progress, according to the Heideggerian spirit. For the genius from la Mancha, everything starts from rootlessness. Rootlessness, which turns out to be very productive, as it finds its own responsibility. From the erratic condition of Don Quixote, the *worldless* man, flourish the call for others. independently of their own world; it is visible when he address the recriminations after he liberated chained gallery slaves in the following words:

“Imbecile, it is not the responsibility or concern of a knight errant to determine if the afflicted, the fettered, and the oppressed whom he meets along the road are in that condition and suffering that anguish because of misdeeds or kind acts. His only obligation is to help them because they are in need, turning his eyes to their suffering and not their wickedness” (First Part, Chapter XXX)

It is not accidental that similar thoughts are characteristic of The Sorrowful Face, because his erratic world, as it lacks location, is the interstice of all worlds. *The lack of location*, then, which despite the dissipation of all concrete form, does not lead to fatuous *following the track* nor floating in the air, alien to human affairs. Don Quixote’s voyage has its own consistency, not because he abandoned the world, but rather because his mundanity consists of *ex-centricity towards* any particular form of the world; that is why the character appears as an *ex-centric* figure at any place to any fellow human being. His mad wandering is the symbol of the destiny of the excluded, against everything that’s solid and established; the symbol of the stigma of being unworldly imposed by the world from which he comes and escapes. Nevertheless, at the same time, it highlights the limits of the society in which he becomes a stranger: his crude criteria, obscure dogma, enclosed misery. In the horizon of sense where the ex-centric is born, he loses the sense disclosing the non-sense of what surrounds him.

Foucault is right when he credits Cervantes, as well as Shakespeare, with the defence/ protection of the tragic experience of madness that had been already fading in their times. The experience of the erring of madman is – in the hinge between the Middle Ages and Modernity – the other side of any age, society or rational sphere: is the reverse inherent to any form of existence. That is why, “insanes” were not

systematically locked up yet. Because of recognizing them as “the Other” inside every one of us, as something “other” interior to “the same”, the sedentary human being was cohabiting with his erring. The madman was allowed to traverse distant fields, or he was entrusted to pilgrims or merchants. He was not called to order, because somehow it was sensed that his disorder was sign of productive chaos, of lucid erring that traverses any mundane stance. The necessity of getting rid of lucid erring and a negative to exclude it, finally converge in the extravagant figure of the *ship of fools*. They were entrusted to sailors in order to avoid their indefinite wandering within the city walls; the ships would take the fools to a random destiny, and once the time came, they were on the sea again. However, this situation affirmed, paradoxically, the intrinsic value of the lack of belonging and of location:

Locked in the ship from which he could not escape, the madman was handed over to the thousand-armed river, to the sea where all paths cross, and the great uncertainty that surrounds all things. A prisoner in the midst of the ultimate freedom, on the most open road of all, chained solidly to the infinite crossroads. He is the Passenger *par excellence*, the prisoner of the passage. (Foucault 2006, 11)

Unaware of the creative *virtue* of erring, Heidegger has deformed the sense of human adventure. Certainly, his conception of *being-in-the-world* is dynamic, and the belonging to the event constitutes an infinite change. Nevertheless, in this particular journey he has only found a part of the necessary luggage: *entrustment* to the *demand* of being rooted to the earth, the listening for what *appeals* from the depths and makes possible a bonding with the world. He did not grasp that in the very heart of *belonging*, of *entrustment*, there also beats an obscure resistance, a *spirit of distance*, concomitant *estrangement*. In this way, the productive madness of erring secreted and injected in the rooting, in a totally unexpected way, some sluggishness which withholds and numbs the openness for the other. Indeed, he highlighted the heroic character of the reckless, the one who plunges into the abyss, but he gave him too grim a face; for he forgot the heroic character of the surface of Quixotesque antihero, he who was able to pair up exploitation and laughter, grandness and lightness, to meet high expectations and be on the ground level of the earth, the tragedy and the vital joy. He introduced in the comprehension of sense – in the coat that covers up human beings when they dwell in open spaces – a desire

of peace and tranquillity which excludes madness of the one who estranges from what he owns and the one who finds peace only through war (against their own intestines and the world).

The ex-centricity is the madness of centricity, which otherwise would tend to repose. The *erratic being* is the madness of *being- rooted- in- the- world*, a madness without which human being would be devoured by the world. In stationary society, madness is the lunge that exhales the desire to start a new territory, like a constrained hurricane awaiting its moment and anticipating it through uneasiness and unrest. Productive erring is not the constant movement around an immobile center. Rather, it is ex-centric with regard to any center, as Don Quixote explains to the housekeeper that wants to retain him in the hacienda, tempting him with the idea that he could become a courtier:

Not all knights can be courtiers, and not all courtiers can or should be knights errant: there has to be some of each in the world, and although we are all knights, there is a vast difference between us; courtiers, without leaving their chambers or passing beyond the threshold of the court, travel the entire world by looking at a map, not spending a *blanca* or suffering heat or cold, hunger or thirst; but we, the true knights errant, measure the earth with our own feet, exposed to the sun, the cold, the wind, and the inclemencies of heaven, both night and day, on foot and on horseback; and we know our enemies not only in portraits but in their actual persons, and no matter the danger and regardless of the occasion we do battle with them, not worrying about trifles or the laws governing duels (...) I have said all this, my dear housekeeper, so that you may see the difference between one kind of knight and another, and it would be right and proper for every prince to esteem more highly the second, or I should say the first kind of knights errant, for as we read in their histories, some among them have been the salvation of not only one kingdom, but many (Second Part: Chapter VI)

The loss, as Heidegger clarifies it, very correctly, as “floating in the air” of the *idle talks*, the “lack of location” of curiosity, the “tracing” in *ambiguity*, and, (speaking) in a deeper and more encompassing way, the “organization of scarcity” and aimless wandering in the age of technique, all these forms of unwinding in the void, are examples of what might be called “courtly erring” in opposition to “Quixotesque erring”. Briefly speaking, the former might be characterized by the totality of fictional adventures, of a centripetal course, where hides the immobile centricity of any stay;

also by the cult of a point of entitative rooting (if we want to employ Heideggerian terms), the long shadow of a stone God in whose honour sacrifices are made (to evoke Nietzsche), or the spectre of a king, whose government slips down as an emanation from the apex to the limes inferior of the pyramid, where the humbles dwell (in Foucaultian spirit). The illusionary stride of courtly erring leaves today its futile trace where the illusion of dynamism substitutes the real pace: in the spectacle of the mass media which replaces the world (means converted into a message); in the discourse of *free world* as an ersatz of liberation; in the overreglamentation of *researching quality* which supplants the impulse of creative liberty; in the dramatization of the Other's suffering, a poor remedy of active listening. All these cases amount to *fictional existence* within the sanity of stationary society, very different from the one demanded by Quixotesque erring; which seems unachievable without a good dose of madness.

II

5 (122-134)

Erratic conflict

1. The unity of rooting- erratic being: “real discordance”
2. World and intelligence in a nascent state: “discover- create” discordance

As seen before, rooting and discordant being stay in a complex relation of reciprocity, in which bonds meet conflict. The relation between these two powers of human condition cannot be understood as a game between two separable poles, that pre-exist before their bond. Neither we can embrace a more encompassing position which would gather both in a synthesis. Its texture is such that it avoids any dual or dialectic cryptoanalysis, based on oppositions and identities.

1

In the first place, it is possible to demonstrate that the rooting and erratic being refer mutually one to another, in such way that trying to comprehend them in their independence or autonomy amounts to nonsense. Against any hermeneutics of Heideggerian provenience, it becomes manifest that *being-in- the- world* means to dwell in an encompassing and comprehensive horizon, but at the same time, it means also to maintain an ex-centric distance towards it. To be integrated in a “world” does not only imply to *pertain* to its field of game, if by it we mean to “correspond to it by *experiencing oneself appealed*”. It is inherent to this ribbing of the world – from where an appealing force emanates and invites and summons to a certain *mode of being* – certain estrangement. It seems strange to us to be part of a mundane course of existence. And this happens to be as ordinary and radical experience as being attached or bonded to the world, dwelling in its bowels. Maybe the estrangement is itself a possibility whose appearance is more extraordinary and unusual than feeling of being inside. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to presuppose that the estrangement is always there, stalking, as it belongs to the sub-representative relation between human being and the world. If there is something like “world” for this being, it is because it can experience oneself as involved with it. And

this kind of experience is not possible unless what involves and concerns stands out as such, outlined on the background of blind uniformity. If human beings can say that it “is”, it is not only because it experience itself as integrated. It also needs to apprehend at the same time the integration itself. That said, such an act of apprehension is impossible unless we presuppose a capability of distancing from reality. Only by taking an ex-centric distance in the very fold of centrality can we transform mute existence in the word “is” and blind belonging into “am”. To express it phenomenologically: if something has to signify anything at all to human beings, it implies that they have already raised it *before themselves*, and thus negated somehow any *a-signification* possible of the world.

At the same time, the assumption of an eternal and immutable *origin* of ex-centricity seems untenable, as if ex-centricity had to belong to the sphere of the transcendental-I and were its *expression*. For if human beings can take a distance from what surrounds them, it is because, *in actu*, they experience themselves “surrounded” by what they take a distance from. How could they estrange about something which is not already in them, close to them and – on a deeper level – something which does not already constitute them from their very insides? Estrangement is either a self-estrangement or it is not estrangement at all. But the “self” moment of this self-reference does not imply that human being is separated from the world, or that he experience himself as “out of” or “at the margin” of reality. Rather, in this way he gains an access to the comprehension of what there- is- in- the- world. Only a rooted being can become perplex of what surrounds him. To “estrangle of something” and “be- in” produce each other mutually.

Beyond Heidegger, we should affirm that *comprehend- oneself- in* situation preserves the estrangement and ex-centric distance which precisely makes possible the apprehension of that something: a world or what surrounds us, *is*. Beyond Husserl, it seems necessary to point out that the *bracketing*, the epoché of any existence is only possible from and in the existence. The ex-centricity which enables cogito to take the a position of an observer has its ground in the possibility of estrangement – that is, in an existential phenomenon, that of erratic power. The following Cartesian formula suffers from an existential deficit: “I think”- that is, I grasp myself and I recognize myself in distance from the world – “therefore I am” thinking being, supratemporal and extracorporeal; that is, I am the unconditional source of reflecting act out of the

distance. But what really occurs is rather that “I can take a distance inasmuch as I belong, here and now, to the event of *being*” and “I can estrange of the world because *I-am- in- the- world* (an angel could not estrange of anything!)”, therefore “*I already think, somehow, in the existence*, which is always temporal and corporal situated”. The movement of experience is not the following: “I take a distance and I estrange *because* I am a thinking being”, but rather “I am a thinking being *because* I can take a distance and estrange”.

It means that – against Heidegger’s belief – there is no vertical relation of respective reference of “thinking” to “being”. Thinking does not constitute a *vernacular* event: it does not entrust itself to the being as if it were its “home” and in such way that it corresponds to it as an answer to a call or appeal. Thinking does not come from the act of being, but is part of it, as human beings cannot apprehend themselves as “being” nor can they apprehend the real as “being” if they are not already situated in an estrangement. The latter presupposes an ex-centric position which should be assumed in every act of thinking, inasmuch as thinking is questioning, which seems incomprehensible unless an experience of ex- appropriation, of lack of fusion with the inhabited soil, is already taking place. We have to acknowledge that, after all, firstly, the “thinking” is a pre-discursive, pre- logical, pre-reflexive event, and that, secondly, there exists a discordant relation of reciprocal generation between being and thinking. Merleau- Ponty went after similar idea in his last writings, and his endeavor still appeals to us:

If it is true that as soon as philosophy declares itself to be reflection or coincidence it prejudices what it will find, then once again it must recommence everything, reject the instruments reflection and intuition had provided themselves, and install itself in a locus where they have not yet been distinguished, in experiences that have not yet been “worked over,” that offer us all at once, pell-mell, both “subject” and “object,” both existence and essence, and hence give philosophy resources to redefine them. Seeing, speaking, even thinking [...] are experiences of this kind, both irrecusable and enigmatic. [...] (MP 1968:130) My body as a visible thing is contained within the full spectacle. But my seeing body subtends this visible body, and all the visibles with it. There is reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in the other. Or rather, if, as once again we must, we eschew the thinking by planes and perspectives, there are two circles, or two vortexes, or two spheres, concentric when I live naïvely, and as

soon as I question myself, the one slightly decentered with respect to the other (Merleau Ponty 1968: 130, 138)

The bond between “two circles or two spheres” was called *chiasm* by Merleau Ponty. His endeavour led him beyond Heidegger and contemporary hermeneutics. In our terminology, the point is to apprehend the nexus between centricity and ex-centricity rooting and erratic condition, by searching for a mutual embrace between the two notions, and a double movement that makes them already reciprocally affectant and affective in pre- logical or sub-representative sphere. G. Deleuze also transited this path, as he situates thinking and being in relationship of “disjunctive synthesis”, that is, the one between two forces that are mutually in debt, mutually affecting; this amounts to – in the course of the becoming of disjunctive synthesis – a productive difference. The course itself is litigious, and both of the forces transforms continuously, giving place to something we might call an “embroiled story”. This is a problem which requires more rigorous analysis. In our attempt to do so in what follows, we would like to show that both Merleau- Ponty’s and Deleuze’s stances are indeed useful, however insufficient. The former, because it conceives the being exclusively through phenomenological lenses, and thus he does not give the step to incorporate the Nietzschean notion of “force” in the analysis of “being- in- the- world”. The latter, because it has led to a new vernacular relationship with other elements: the sub-representative (or molecular) world and the world of representation (or molar world).

It has now become more clear that the relationship between centricity and ex-centricity, world rooting and the erratic condition, avoids any cryptodualist and cryptoidentitary thought – as we already suggested. A hidden dualism holds sway where the elements are judged to be dependent on a different origin: intuition- reason, sensibility- rationality, lifeworld- reflection, passion- action, etc. When they are conceived as “opposite poles” for instance, the same mistake is committed; indeed, the tension between both becomes dependent – in a furtive and surprising manner – on *two* immiscible, contrary and yet inexorably united principles. In his *Essay on negative magnitudes*, Kant proposed with great finesse a conception of the world that does not segregate a Heraclitean war, as he attempts at describing it as “a conflict between real and contradictory causes” and as “a fight among forces”. In part, the lucidity of Kantian reflection consists of bringing into light the difference between

logical opposition (or *negation*), which is an unthinkable contradiction, and *real opposition*, a conflict between two principles or forces which takes place in reality. This widely employed distinction grants the factual world with compelling conflictive character, a discordant being that – as later stated by Th. W. Adorno – cannot be dissolved in internal neatness and consistency of concepts. However, regardless interpretation of the notion discerned by the philosopher from Königsberg, it is obvious that the real conflict present in existence cannot be thought in terms of oppositions. The very notion of oppositional conflict presupposes two possible scenarios: either a dualistic one, which makes each “pole” dependent on the contrary principle (moral and radical evil, reason and inclination, for example); or an identity one, according to which one of the poles is comprehended as the negation of the other (for example, what debt is to income), but where the hierarchy between both is grounded upon preeminence of one of them (like cold, which is a negative heat or vice, negative virtue). Now existing conflicts are not oppositions of contraries or relations between positive and corresponding negative magnitudes (as if love could be conceived as opposing hatred, being the latter conceptualized either as a contrary principle or as a “lack of love”). But if we take this example as illustrative, the relation “love- hatred” is a fiction, if we think of it in terms of opposition, yet is a “necessary fiction” imposed by our language. There are no two extreme principles that order relations as if fueled by an obscure engine. If we take into account the realities that this relation refers to, we would rather say that there comes to occur a process of genesis. There are relations of mutual affection between human beings; the course of many of them leads to what can be called an “adherent affection” whereas many other, maybe a majority of them, to a “destructive affection”. These affections *follow their own course*, generate themselves in an encounter, *in fieri*, they emerge *in a nascent state* from relationship between them, and they have many faces, a plurality of forms, which are irremissible to any background *rule* that could impulse them all, or to any universal *concept* that would classify them under particular “cases”. Only later, once we reach the tower of abstraction that reduces the richness of the real, we give it a generic title of “love” or “hatred”. For, by using oppositional language we have forgotten – let us say it in Nietzschean fashion – the reductive oppression of the concept, the notion, the representation. Oppositions are “necessary lies”, whose pragmatic and utilitarian origin in the framework of human communication has been forgotten.

An “opposition” is only an abstract image of real struggle. The real struggle discloses *distinctions* in their becoming. The conflict could be called, according to what we said and following G. Deleuze, “real distinction”. Oppositions are “thick shaped” distinctions, always secondary, *a posteriori* or *ex post factum* when compared to a multiplicity of real distinctions. That is why, the relationship between centricity and ex-centricity, rooting and erratic condition cannot be comprehended as opposition. Because they are grasped “generically” or “universally”, these notions are *the ladder which must be thrown away once climbed up*. Because of their claim of concreteness, these concepts are plastic and ultimately they refer to a variety of *real* phenomena which thinking strives to grasp, but ,which possibly cannot be closed as an idea. These very concepts are undergoing a process of genesis. What is more, there are already in the aforementioned process, *in a nascent state*.

Nevertheless, the playground in which Deleuzian notions of real “distinction” and “disjunctive synthesis” become fertile is restricted. Their limit is due to the fact that they only apply to a basic existence of plurality of forces or singularities. If we take for grounded – as in the case of social analysis – that *there is given* multiplicity of forces in relationship, then it is possible to explore the richness of those ideas, as they show up to what extent the very difference, between diverse components but prior to them can substitute the traditional principle of Identity. Nevertheless, against a similar approach one can always inquire into the surge of plexus of what is different; and how we account for difference without taking it as a *given*. The solution to the problem we are facing is difficult. For it depends on two requirements whose compatibility sets thinking in a paradoxical or aporetic framework: on the one hand, I requires to think the difference without any resort to an explanatory and identity principle that could embrace it. On the other hand, to think the difference as a surprising – as such – phenomenon, in need of comprehension that would exceed mere assumption of a *factum*. The notion of *real discordance* we attempt to express is not the solution of enigma, but rather the enigma itself. The enigma is as follows: beyond any contrary presumptions that (i) the different is the expression of the identical and (ii) the identical is a construct derived from the interplay of the different, both of them, namely identity and difference, the one and the multiple, are in mutual debt while constituting themselves in reciprocity. This is the mystery of a discordance which is inherent to “*being*”. First of all, “real discordance” does not imply two pre-

existing terms. Each of them is due to another. So there is no place for negation that emerges from a previous affirmation, either factually or logically. The one is *in unison* with the other. Nor it presupposes ultimate identity of both component. They are in unison, however in an discordant way, that is, in disagreement. Finally, it does not assume the difference between elements, and rather maintains it, as an interrogation. Maybe this is the *limit concept* which surpasses the boundaries of reason and discourse. In any case, it is imposed by its own right from experience.

Indeed, when we turn to inexorable experiences of rooting and erratic- being, of centricity and ex- centricity, it is the very discordance that puts them in relationship. The experience “world” implies simultaneity and discordance between rooting and erratic experience. We do not experience ourselves *in- the- world*, rooted, without the ex-centric experience which makes the comprehension “it is” possible, and which moves us towards the “outside” of any “world”. And we could not adopt the last possibility of affection if it weren’t because we experience ourselves already “in” the world. To say “rooting and erratic experience” is to attempt to express a *real discordance*.

Another term could have been employed. But we are attracted by the force of the Latin origin: “discord” comes from *discordare*, which means “being different”, and also “dissent”. Its origin can be traced in *cor- cordis*, heart or affect on the one hand, and intelligence- spirit- talent, on the other. The idiosyncrasy of the term suggests its lack of harmony – just like in music- in the very heart of something. In coherence with this idea, it happens that “erratic- being” is rich in its Latin origin, which leads us to think of it in a discordant way, as it can be related both to the notion of “lacking location” as “being in course” by departing from concrete rooting and abandoning it continuously. In this sense, the notion of erratic- being should be taken as a compendium of discordance we analyse. For it is there where the dimension of rooting is grasped, as its necessary obverse, and, in a more essential way, a discordant character of the event of *being*. In the fiber of the erratic there quivers both the belonging to the world and the phenomenon of estrangement, inseparable from the former. This discordance is proper to the human condition, if only it is comprehended as productive disharmony and not in its martial sense.

- *But don't You think that, cagily, you repeat the Deleuzian conception of event as "nomadic", Sir?*
- *Oh well, it's been a time since You last appeared here, Sir. You've been absent for a good while.*
- *No, I was just waiting for You to get out of the mess You entered in relation to Heidegger: the proper and the appropriate, then the proper and inappropriate... All too heavy and academic for my liking.*
- *It was an unavoidable step, as I warned You, Sir. The mess is not proper of philosophy but of the problems themselves it touches. But let us leave it aside. You can disregard it, if you please. As to Your suspicion, let me say no. The nomadism, if we think of it in a Deleuzian fashion, does not take into account the character of estrangement of erratic existence. The notion of Deleuze refers to a condition founded in centrality; it is, after all, an expression of rooting however it differs from the Heideggerian concept: it is more about the rooting, "the cluster of roots, united and tangled". Rhizomatic being is still rooted being. As we are about to see, it is in the estrangement which is part of erratic wandering, where lays not only the insertion in the ground (which is something always to do), but, at the same time the ex-centric distance which can be found in many requirements of modernity, discredited as such by philosophies of difference. These requirements are nevertheless retrievable from other perspectives, such as the genesis of discourse or the universalizing character of certain intersubjective norms, but they do not lead us to embrace emancipated forms of ex-centricity which are asserted by new-fashioned enlightened philosophers, such as Habermas for instance.*
- *Well, we'll see. On the other hand, the appeal to etymology seems surprising to me. ¿Isn't it a crave for "origin", the same thing You blame Heidegger for?*
- *The only sense of this appeal is to justify the terminology I used. Heidegger was fond of employing German and Greek as he considered them more philosophical. He would often start a discourse by stating "in our language...". I express myself in my language. And I am offended by this implicit contempt of the Latin. What is more, I believe that Latin world can awake from its slumber and say what he can and should say.*
- *A new chauvinism, I see.*

- *No, man, do not misunderstand me. It would not be congruent, as erratic being is not into defence of any particular ground. It does not carry the banner of the “proper”, as property is not sacred to it. It is rather the demand of diversity that is at stake. We who accidentally, by birth, speak this language, should not be ashamed of using it. IT is correct to give voice to our words and meanings, always being aware that we aim at removing the gags and not imposing them.*

2

It is a widely spread topic that thinking surges from the capacity of awe or wonder before reality. This commonplace is not meaningless. However, if we affirm that factum without asking for its genesis, we remain half way. And a principle of clarification is offered in the phenomenon we have been pursuing; that is, in the discordant simultaneity between self- understanding as in-the-world and estrangement. As we said, it is inconceivable for human beings to have the “ world ” without taking into account the latter statement. However ,inasmuch as they estranges of themselves and what surrounds them, human beings have set up – from the very beginning of their wandering – an ex-centric force which puts into movement and articulates what has been called intelligence. Before complex reasoning governed by rules, before explicit judgement, the sub-representative ex-centricity inherent to erratic- being discloses itself as a stream of intelligent organization of experience. The world is never immediately given to a being that is inserted in its environment only by evading it, and thus refusing to surrender to blind fusion. It is rather what is completely close and the most distant at the same time. Close, as the “ is ” which is there, as sheltering instance. Distant, because only the ex-centric laceration of dismayed and blind belonging produces the glimmer of “ is .” And because this estranging tremor is persistent and insists on the existence, which takes form of an unavoidable event, the human “ world ” is never given or consummated. It is always in a nascent state. The world in fieri has never had a stationary “ been ” nor he will ever possess an unfading “ will be .” It is itself erratic. And if it has often adopted a form of an ordered and immovable cosmos ,it was artificial, constructed in order to silence unsettling threats of uneasiness, which keep demanding their balm. And if we think about it as of goal of fulfilment or pacified ideal, it by virtue of an inverted stationary will, which is projected into the future. In both cases there sounds

and archaic human fear of event, which is always a bottomless" is being "and ever nascent promise. The fear collapses the fruition of budding life.

Thus, inasmuch as the ex-centric estrangement traverses all centrality, the world is at stake between belonging and making. This is the infancy of thinking which is extended to all experience, and which precedes its philosophical and scientific expressions, as well as any reflexive self-aware praxis in general. As they lack ground articulated from and by itself, human beings *articulate* their world. As shown by Merleau-Ponty, the body itself "thinks" in its savage contact with the environment. The most insignificant form of human existence looms on the basis of an intelligently pre-logical organization of experience. "That what is" appears only inasmuch as it is being incorporated in the ribbing of a mundane scenario, where the ingredients of what we call "the real", forge a landscape of ongoing experience: foreground, the background, the elevation and the dip. Once the **intelligent dealing with things has** traced the ribbing of its world, the latter is dwelled and covered by explicit reasons, conscious purposes, convictions and reflexive judgments.

Being is already thinking. But thinking does not ordinarily mean to put voluntarily into movement distilled forms of reasoning: logical, argumentative or planning [ones] etc. First and foremost, thinking is a pre-conscious *dynamis*; its being is *ongoing* existence, providing it with significant form, working it according to the meanders of actions, orientative horizons, underground gradations of values, furtive anticipations, silent positioning, nameless and conceptless assignments etc..., in sum, all the backroom activity that *configures* the world. It is a *nascent intelligence*.

The problem we are posing here requires as its starting point an analysis of discordance which is incarnated in the assembly "discover- create", a pair which is in latent conflict through big part in contemporary philosophy. What is the practical logic of intelligence? Can we say it is the *discovery* of realities? Or is it rather that the intelligence does not discover but creates them? To identify this alternative roughly in terms of *realism* and *idealism* would mean to simplify the problem. These concepts are excessively generic and each of them has polisemic meaning, that is why their operability is only orientative. As a very abstract index of distance between the classic and the medieval world, on the one hand, and the central character of modernity, on the other, both concepts refer to two possible outcomes: the forge of

knowledge from a substantial reality or a Cartesian comprehension according to which the object is “posed” (elaborated and fixed) by the subject. However, in the present situation that concerns us, these “idealist” principle of modernity has been convulsed by phenomenology, and thus it is impossible to speak about a subject which remains in *pro-ductive* relation with the object anymore; it is more about the *field of experience* where the active “projection” and the passive “apprehension” of the being (which is the mode of presentation or sense) mutually interpret each other. Husserlian phenomenology departs from a priori of correlation according to which the *object constitution* and its *self-givenness* are parts of the same act: in the same movement the being is projected from the act of lived experience and apprehended from itself, due to the fact that reality which appears to the *lifeworld* is a realm of meaning which demands – in its very appearance – a proper direction of projective experience. This correlation fleshes itself out on post idealistic and hermeneutical phenomenology and plausibly transcends and exceeds the realism- idealism alternative. For it can not be admitted anymore neither that the real is constructed nor that it is the absorbent and adherent soil for knowledge. So, if we accommodate ourselves in this surpass and overcoming (which refer to *Überwindung* and *Verwindung* in Heideggerian terms) of idealism- realism contention, we move on towards a different scenario, where the classical disjunction adopts other forms. The one we are facing right now, the split or the decision between experiences of “discovery” and “creation”, turns out to be crucial. In both cases a playground is presupposed, a playground where *being affected and affecting enter into contention*. However, whereas the patient dimension of *in-citing* the world in language is prevalent *in discovery*, in *creation* it is the one of *ex-citing* a new world. This alternative elicits relationship between centric rooting and ex-centric erratic being.

A minimal proof of this latent contemporary polemic can be found in the circumstance that we tend to colour the realism- idealism option with these categories when we look back into the past, rephrasing it from within. So, for example, the entire critique of tradition which emanates from existential phenomenology and continues in philosophy of difference (Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida) or in weak thought (Vattimo) subsumes the terms of this alternative in the global complex of identitary thinking or philosophy of presence, whose common root would consist of looking at the world as

something which must be discovered and grasped in *image*. This *optic metaphor* is opposing the force of rupture and creatively available dimension of forces in relation or of writing. Their enlightened enemies (Habermas, Apel) on their behalf, do not hesitate to set against the Kantian reason, aprioric and sullen towards sensibility, the reason of communicative action, a rationality already *inserted* in the *lifeworld*, which – although it is discovered through reconstructive procedure – is identified as generative of intersubjective processes of understanding. “Generative” does not mean as much as “creative”, obviously, but it has some family resemblance with the latter, as the generative movement operates through speech acts. These contain a performative and pragmatic force (claims of true, correctness, sense and veracity) which can be objectivated but which also boost factual novelty; an *in actu* force responsible of dynamic creation of interpersonal bonds. Certainly, the frequent appeal to structures or generative conditions which are inherent to the language-world unity (both in the dialogic action theory of Habermas- Apel and in the linguistic one of Chomsky, and further in the multiple directions that stem from initial speech acts theory, e.g. Austin, Searle, etc.) embraces the idea of *performance*, that is, of innovative realisation of rules in praxis. On the other hand, while looking back into the most distant past, the categories of discovery/creation do their work nowadays. It seems difficult to imagine a Greek realism where the real could be conceived as “created” by the subject. Nevertheless, realist perspectives offered in Platonic and Aristotelian scenarios are quite different. In the first case, the reality of Ideas are discovered through a process of depuration of particularity which leads to the realization of what is universal. In the second case, as Gadamer indicates, an organization of impressions in general conceptual unities is rather presupposed and in such fashion that the *discovery* incorporates a power which could be regarded from our contemporary perspective as “creative”, inasmuch as the transition of multiplicity of concrete experience to its capture under a rule is not precisely subjected to any logical regulation.

The conflict between discovery and creation is especially clear in our contemporary scenario through the sieve of confrontation between Heidegger and Nietzsche. Due to its actuality and difficulty it will hold a specific place in our posterior analysis. In any case, we aim at affirming an unavoidable binding discordance between discovery and creation. On the one hand, it is impossible to *really* create if the reality itself is not

present in the emerging movement of innovation, if it does not appear as the “thing itself” which appeals to its own transcending. If it is not the case, the *creation is empty*. It does not show through itself any novum from the world, but a mere novelty proper of evanescent heights of decadence, from an empty place which organizes itself and experiences necessity to hide its own misery. It conforms a genealogy of constructed artefact, of the contrivance made autonomous - a phenomenon which has penetrated forcefully in the present. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the appeal which inspires something new, “the other”, and which is dis-covered in creative process, would be blind, if it was not accommodated within the experience of *estrangement*. The latter works as a *tacit witness* of explicit reflection which reconducts in a discordant way any givenness through cutting twinge; this invites us to take a leap into the void and to desire a new territory. The richness of the call for *novum* does not consume itself without an *ex-centric* and painful *gaze* at the desert of the future “will be”. Caught in this chiasm, it is not enough to *entrust oneself* to the possibility of another birth. This should be accompanied with tremor and the impact generated by *knowing oneself* meant to be born. It is convenient to highlight the first sentence of Neruda’s words, which penetrate into this obscure *existential apperception*: *to be born I was born, to encircle the step/ of all that it comes closer, of all that to my breast beats as a new trembling heart*.

Discovery and creation, belonging to the world and the making of it, are two sides of the same discordant event. The world is *in a nascent state*. Its “being” and its “making” go hand in hand. For the human being that dwells within it, the world is a fledgling abode, where the rooting and the erratic being meet together and interpret each other. At the same time, thinking - in its infancy - sustains itself in the bud. It does not simply answer to the world. Nor does it invent the un-world. We could say that the *nascent intelligence* ferments in the discordant juncture between human *belonging* and the extradition which the erratic being experiences towards any world.